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Introduction
This paper examines the institutional determinants of incentives to repay in Costa Rica and their
effects on defaults and the design of financial contracts. Enforcement mechanisms help to
determine how much is paid back to creditors and how much shareholders receive as dividends.
Theoretically, however, the most important effects will be on the observable characteristics of
contracts, as rational agents foresee the incentives of other parties. As courts enforce contracts
and punish defaulters, they determine the form contracts take and the magnitude and direction of
investments.
Recent work by La Porta et al. (1996) reports significant differences in the financial
market of countries that have different types of legal systems. The most notable difference is
between countries with a French civil law system and those with British common law traditions.
Costa Rica is much closer to the civil law tradition.
1 While this international comparison is by
itself highly suggestive, a closer look at actual enforcement, contracting design, and creditors’
outcomes in Costa Rica can provide a better understanding of the effectiveness of the legal
framework, alternative enforcement mechanisms, and lenders’ responses in allocating credit.
The paper contains findings on the practices of financial intermediaries that are discussed
in the context of contract theory, with a focus on the formal financial intermediaries that are
scattered throughout the country.
2 Much of the information comes from primary sources,
including a sample of almost 1,700 civil trials and a detailed survey on the credit policies of 31
intermediaries.
3 The data cover a large variety of intermediaries, permitting an investigation of
the ways outcomes vary with creditor practices.
This paper reviews the creditor-borrower relationship at all stages—ex ante, interim, and
ex post. The evidence supports the importance of collateral and other ex post repayment
incentives. Collateral is a critical variable in granting a loan, as well as in determining how
closely the bank follows it, how much is recovered in case of default, and how efficiently the
courts function as an enforcement mechanism.  The evidence also suggests that, contrary to the
common view, banks are not passive lenders. They remain alert to how well projects perform
                                                       
1 Costa Rica is not included in their study. The corresponding values are derived from the authors’ own readings of
the Civil and Commercial Codes. The values are reported in Monge, Cascante and Hall (2000).
2 Thus important sectors such as housing credit, trade and retail credit, and informal credit are omitted.
3 Box 1 identifies the banks interviewed.4
and rely on previous experience and a rather sophisticated informational network in granting
credit.
Financial Intermediation in Costa Rica
Despite Costa Rica’s small economy, a diverse group of financial intermediaries operates in the
country.
4 While demographic heterogeneity could explain the variety of intermediaries,
government intervention has also had a remarkable effect. After the civil war in 1948, the new
government nationalized the three largest commercial banks.  Together with the already public
National Bank, these banks have since allocated most of the credit in Costa Rica. The new
government regarded nationalization as one of its major achievements, and later attempts to
liberalize these banks faced fierce opposition from specific interest groups as well as widespread
skepticism and general unpopularity. Important political sectors still oppose efforts to complete
the privatization of the remaining public financial intermediaries. Nationalization prevented
private entities from accepting deposits, but government intervention was not confined to the
creation of this “deposit monopsony.” The Central Bank was given direct control over interest
rates (both lending and borrowing) and over the allocation of credit through quantitative
restrictions on lending for different activities.
The events of the second half of the twentieth century in Costa Rica can be succinctly
summarized as a very slow but persistent reversal of earlier nationalization policies. In 1972 non-
banking institutions were allowed to obtain funds from the public in the form of investment
certificates. While restrictions were placed on the maturity of these certificates, the simple fact of
their existence resulted in a remarkable growth in private intermediaries, both in number and in
shares of total bank credit (Figures 1 and 2). In 1984 private banks began  intermediating
resources from foreign loans, national institutions, and multilateral cooperation agencies. In the
second half of the 1980s, the authorities lifted credit quotas and ended direct regulation of
interest rates. Moreover after the liquidity crisis of 1987, the General Auditor of Banks extended
its authority to include nonbonding institutions, becoming the General Auditor of Financial
Institutions (AGEF). But the reform maintained important asymmetries among intermediaries.
First, private banks could not receive deposits with a maturity of less than 180 days. Second,
                                                       
4 As of September 1998, the Superintendency of Financial Institutions (SUGEF) was regulating 3 commercial public
banks, 23 private banks, 35 savings and loan cooperatives, 17 private nonbanking financial companies, 9 mutual
funds for housing, and 3 other intermediaries created under special laws.5
they did not have access to the Central Bank discount window. Third, the AGEF did not regulate
cooperatives and other intermediaries created by special laws. Fourth, the Central Bank
implicitly backed only those deposits issued by public institutions.
Liberalization generated a trend of decreasing concentration in the banking industry, as
illustrated by the most common concentration indices, here applied to the assets of regulated
intermediaries (Figures 3 and 4).
5 The figures show that the decrease in concentration is the
result of the greater presence of private banks and also to the lower concentration within the
group of private intermediaries.
The 1990s ushered in a new wave of liberalization. Restrictions on operations in foreign
currency that had long been in place were, for all practical purposes, relaxed for all types of
banks. Asymmetries in the regulation of financial intermediaries were eliminated. Private banks
were given access to the discount window of the Central Bank and allowed to accept deposits
with any maturity, including demand deposits.
6 In 1998 the government  instituted a further
reform, creating three superintendencies to regulate financial markets under the control of the
National Council of Financial Supervision (CONASIF). The  AGEF became the General
Superintendency of Financial Entities; two other agencies, the General Superintendency of Stock
Markets (SUGEVAL) and the General Superintendency of Pension Funds (SUPEN) regulate the
securities markets and pension funds, respectively. The new  Superintendency of Financial
Entities extended its supervisory powers to the savings and loans cooperatives and other special
banks like the Banco Popular, which is financed with compulsory savings from workers and
employers. The  superintendency follows the guidelines set out in the Basle Accords. While
regulation in terms of capital, liquidity, and management varies across types of intermediary,
                                                       
5 The following explanation applies: N is the number of firms in an industry and  j=1,2,3...,N indexes each of them.
In addition  pj  is the share of firm  j in the industry. The Hirschman-Herfindhal index is defined as  HH
￿ = ”
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Overall assets rather than just credit are used here, because government debt and other bonds are an important
component of banks’ portfolios. The calculations exclude institutions like Banco Popular, the Fund of the National
Teachers Association (ANDE), and the cooperatives, which until recently were not regulated.
6 Banking intermediaries can create checking accounts, provided they open agencies in rural areas or deposit part of
these accounts in the public banks.6
credit is regulated and graded uniformly. Despite these changes, the Central Bank still insures
only the deposits of public banks.
7
Intermediaries finance a wide variety of activities (Figure 5).
8 The largest share is
personal credit, which encompasses any financing used for household consumption, including
credit cards (housing, however, is included under “other”). Services include tourism, the
country’s fastest-growing industry since the late 1990s. Agriculture and other primary sectors
represent a very small fraction of bank credit. While bank credit is not necessarily representative
of total credit, this breakdown of activities financed by banks shows the variety of uses for
credit.
9
Since 1995 public and private banks have shared the credit market almost equally (Figure
2).
10 Yet the activities they finance differ (Figure 6). Public banks are markedly more dominant
in agriculture, reflecting their extensive network of agencies and branches in rural areas and their
institutional expertise. But credit to the fastest growing productive sectors—manufacturing,
commerce, and services—is largely in the hands of private banks, reflecting the greater
flexibility these banks show in responding to new activities. In some sectors special banks have
acquired a notable market share, including the Fund of the National Association of Teachers
(ANDE) and Banco Popular (personal credit) and the National Bank of Mortgages and Housing,
or BANVHI (housing credit).
Overall default rates are not very high, especially for public and private banks, and reflect
mostly arrears. Moreover, banks experience the highest default rates in those sectors where their
participation is lowest (Figure 7). On average private banks have lower default rates than public
banks. Except for the small number of loans in legal collection, however, the difference in the
default rates of private and public banks is not great. For special banks, however, the default
rates can be significant. The largest number of defaulted loans are in the manufacturing sector
                                                       
7 This fact is not explicitly stated. But the Central Bank backed the deposits of the liquidated Banco Anglo, although
it has not covered the deposits of liquidated private banks such as the Banco Germano.
8 Cooperatives are not included because, as of 1998, they had not been added to the database.
9 Several biases exist, however. First, a large fraction of credit for agricultural uses is generated in nonbanking
institutions, as in the coffee sector. Second, as confirmed by interviews with bankers conducted as part of this study,
many loans to other productive sectors are classified as personal credit because borrowers want to speed up the
approval process. Third, a large share of personal credit is allocated by cooperatives, retail stores, and other traders.
Fourth, housing is largely financed by the Mutuales, financial companies that specialize in housing credit. Some
casual evidence also suggests that the credit extended by street vendors, informally called polacos, is important for
urban low-income households.
10 The balance has been changing, however. In February 1998 private banks had a larger share in total credit.7
(55 percent of loans are late or in legal collection). This pattern suggests that the intermediary’s
expertise in the sector reduces the default rate.
Contract Design and Bank-Borrower Relationships
Since the legal framework is common to all intermediaries, any differences in the number of
defaults across banks must result from differences among the banks themselves—and their
clients. Matching borrowers and intermediaries, a process probably complicated by adverse
selection, can account for some of the differences. But ultimately these differences are
determined by the intermediaries’ credit policies, which affect repayment incentives. These
policies set screening procedures, collateral requirements, methods of monitoring active loans,
and actions taken on non-performing loans.
The information presented here on credit policies is based on responses from a sample of
31 intermediaries to a 1998 questionnaire.
11 The sample consists of 15 branches of the 3 public
banks, 8 private banks, 5 savings and credit cooperatives and 3 other banks (Banco Popular and 2
private banks) owned and managed by groups such as cooperatives and labor unions (Box 1).
12
The sample provides geographic and demographic variety. It contains 13 intermediaries in the
San Jose metropolitan area (all with headquarters in San Jose) and 18 intermediaries scattered in
various rural areas, including the southern and northern regions and the Pacific and Atlantic
watersheds.
The intermediaries are classified according to demographic type (metropolitan or rural)
and institutional type (public, private, cooperative, and other). The questionnaire used three types
of multiple-choice questions designed to measure how often intermediaries take certain actions
and whether certain items are relevant to credit procedures. The first involves the frequency of a
given action by the intermediary; the alternatives are never, rarely, occasionally, frequently, very
frequently, always. The second type asks the relevance of a given item; the alternatives are
irrelevant, little importance, some importance, important, very important, crucial. The third type
                                                       
11 No public record or comprehensive study on the credit policies of intermediaries is available. The questionnaire
was answered by the intermediaries’ credit manager with the help of credit and collection personnel.
12 The two cooperative banks were liquidated in 1999.8
is a yes-or-no question. For tractability the answers are grouped as frequently to always and
important to crucial.
13
Screening Projects and Borrowers
In general entrepreneurs know more about themselves and their projects than creditors do. Most
theoretical models take one of two extreme views: that the characteristics of the project are
common knowledge or that only the entrepreneur knows them. The latter view leads to models of
adverse selection in which intermediaries’ contracts must consider the incentives to
entrepreneurs of revealing such information. In practice, however, banks can try to acquire
information on projects and entrepreneurs. This type of information gathering is costly, but it can
help banks decide whether to grant loans and what terms to apply.
The questionnaire asked banks about the process used to investigate credit applications.
The questions covered every practice that could conceivably yield useful information about the
prospects of a project and the characteristics of the borrower and the collateral. The results show
that banks (especially private institutions located in the San Jose metropolitan area) actively
screen potential borrowers (Table 8). For example, 85 percent of metropolitan banks and 75
percent of private banks visit firms that apply for credit, especially new clients. In general
intermediaries check the applicant’s reputation, although metropolitan and rural banks use
different mechanisms.
The most common screening activity is careful scrutiny of both the collateral and the
borrower’s overall assets, including a review of relevant financial statements. Regulation indeed
provides an incentive to demand collateral, because banks are required to maintain reserves on
loans (depending on performance); for large loans, reserve requirements depend on collateral.
While banks take project risk into account, they assign only moderate importance to sectoral and
international risk. Finally, intermediaries sometimes suggest modifications to the intended use of
funds, but this practice is not particularly pervasive.
The questionnaire allowed respondents to prioritize various criteria for granting a loan.
Because different combinations of these items could produce the same result for an application,
respondents were asked to note how much a positive assessment of each item would increase the
                                                       
13 The choices for frequency were never, rarely, occasionally, frequently, very frequently, and always. The options
for relevance are irrelevant, little importance, some importance, important, very important, and crucial.  The results
are grouped as “frequently to always” and “important to crucial,” and these categories are used in the analysis.9
chances of approval.
14 All the items included in the questionnaire were rated as very important
(Table 9). But borrower’s characteristics—including solvency, credit references, previous
experience, and collateral—were considered more relevant than project characteristics.
Determining the Interest Rate and Other Terms
According to economic theory, banks and entrepreneurs consider each other’s incentives when
designing contractual agreements. These incentives appear at different times—before and during
the period covered by the contract and after the contract is concluded. Contractual arrangements
may stipulate action plans and payment schedules, but one key variable is the interest rate.
Respondents were asked to rate the importance of various loan characteristics in setting the
interest rate (Table 10).
Surprisingly, the most important consideration in setting interest rates is the sector
(economic activity of the project). This finding seems to be the inertial heritage of the
interventionist epoch. However, items such as collateral, credit references, and previous
experience—which are very important in the approval process—still retained some importance
in setting interest rates, especially for private banks.
Interest rates are only one element in the contracts, which usually include a section on
terms of reference that sets out certain procedures for both parties. The contents of this section
are unlimited, and in principle it can be used to introduce responses to contingencies as well as
communication and monitoring procedures. Banks make active use of this section. For instance,
covenants can make provisions for contingencies—useful for dividing risks between
entrepreneurs and intermediaries (Table 11). Table 12 shows the number of banks using
covenants to cover shocks (called “unforeseen problems” in the questionnaire).  Contrary to the
predictions of models of risk sharing using private information, intermediaries set forth
covenants more frequently for idiosyncratic shocks than aggregate shocks, even though the latter
are more easily observable. Of the groups examined, public banks in rural areas set forth the
greatest number of covenants for aggregate shocks. No private bank uses covenants for regional
shocks, and only one metropolitan branch of a public bank does so. Covenants for shocks from
projects and entrepreneurs are much more common among private banks. For the most part,
cooperatives do not use covenants.
                                                       
14 As opposed to a negative assessment—that is, how much a negative report on an item would affect the chance of10
The responses suggest that, if anything, covenants are used to monitor the projects that
are financed. Intermediaries were asked how frequently they use covenants to specify alternative
monitoring mechanisms (Table 13). The responses to this question differ radically from the
responses to the previous one. Banks use covenants primarily to oblige entrepreneurs to report on
the results of the investment, to call back a loan or enact other suspension measures, and to
mandate visits from bank officials. All but one of the private banks and cooperatives reported
using the clauses for these purposes. It is safe to say, then, that covenants are used for monitoring
purposes and not to offer insurance to entrepreneurs.
Monitoring
The questionnaire asked intermediaries about monitoring practices on outstanding loans. Again,
most theoretical models make one of two extreme assumptions: that entrepreneurial effort (or
physical investment) is unverifiable or that it can be verified at no cost. Both parties are better off
if effort is verifiable, since the absence of moral hazard enhances possibilities for risk sharing
and allows for relatively large projects (among other things). Contrasting these stylized models
suggests that any mechanism banks can use to verify borrowers’ actions can benefit both parties,
the only counterweight being the cost of the mechanism. For instance, intermediaries would like
to commit to monitoring borrowers, even in a random fashion, unless monitoring costs are
prohibitive.
Table 13 reports the frequency of different actions across banks in the sample. As before,
each entry indicates the number of banks within each category. Banks were asked how
frequently they took each action before problems such as delays in payment developed. The
findings show that banks actively follow projects’ development and that they actively monitor,
especially whether the loan is effectively used for the investment plan agreed upon. They require
copies of invoices or other documents showing how resource were used, send bank officials to
visit firms, and keep abreast of firms’ overall solvency by reviewing financial statements.
Previous Experience
In the presence of constraints on incentives, the repeated interaction of parties can radically
change the nature of the optimal contract and effectively increase expected welfare. The intuition
                                                                                                                                                                                  
approval.11
is simple: future payments and actions can be set as functions of current outcomes and actions,
and since repeated replication of static contracts is always feasible, repeated interactions must
necessarily increase the set of attainable allocations that is compatible with incentives.
Intermediaries were asked how they use the information acquired during previous
experience with the borrower (Table 14). Nearly all the intermediaries keep a record of their
experiences with the borrower and maintain an automated grading system. Borrowers are not
always aware of this practice, however. Given the potential role of incentives in loan repayment,
it is surprising that intermediaries are not more inclined to tell their clients about it. In fact, only
three out of eight private banks tell their clients about this record.
How does such experience affect contracts between banks and borrowers? As already
noted, previous experience is very important in deciding whether to grant loans. But it is also
important in setting the terms of contracts (Table 15). It has a significant effect on most of the
activities under consideration. Some 24 of 31 respondents regard it as important to the speed
with which they process loan applications, the collateral requirements, the overall credit
evaluation, the amount lent, and other  renegotiation clauses. Previous performance can be
described as relationship collateral, since it plays a role similar to physical collateral. Only its
effect on the repayment terms of the loan is surprisingly small. Fewer than two-thirds of lenders
(19 respondents) regard previous experience as important in setting the maturity, interest rate,
repayment schedule, and grace period. Thus long-term relationships with banks are important in
facilitating Costa Rican companies’ access to credit, even though the relationships have few
effects on interest rates and other terms of loan contracts.
Implicit Contingencies, Default, and Renegotiation
Projects financed by banks and other intermediaries usually entail risks that are beyond the
control of both the entrepreneur and the creditor. A financial contract defines how the returns of
the project will be divided. The repayment schedule, a function of how well the project is
realized, defines how risk is allocated. In the absence of agency problems, both parties’ attitude
toward risk and the agents’ hedging ability determine the optimal repayment schedule. One
assumption that is commonly made—and that has intuitive appeal—is that financial
intermediaries have greater risk tolerance, because they finance many projects with (partly)12
uncorrelated returns. The optimal contract under these circumstances allocates most of the risk to
the creditor.
This result contrasts sharply with actual financial contracts, most of  which are debt
contracts that in principle assign all risk to the borrower. Theoretical models can reconcile this
fact with theory of agency problems. For example if the efforts of entrepreneurs are not
observable or simply not contractible, entrepreneurs must face risks that stimulate effort.
Alternatively if only the entrepreneurs observe the outcome but intermediaries can audit at a
cost, the optimal contract takes the form of debt with the possibility of default. But incentive
problems only limit the scope for risk sharing. Generally, theory predicts that repayment depends
on how well projects are realized.
As has been noted explicit contingency clauses are a common feature of loan contracts.
But what about implicit contingency clauses?  Table 16 shows the response of banks to four
different types of shocks. A significant number of intermediaries are willing to consider
renegotiating their contracts when shocks occur. Metropolitan banks are more inclined to do so
than rural  banks, and intermediaries are more likely to renegotiate because of idiosyncratic
shocks than they are because of aggregate shocks.
The questionnaire also asked also about the terms banks are most willing to renegotiate
when a borrower has difficulty making payments (Table 17). Banks appear to be most flexible in
extending the term of the loan; many are even willing to grant grace periods. Metropolitan banks
are more inclined to renegotiate than rural banks on all points. Private and public banks tend to
be willing to renegotiate different items but in general renegotiate more frequently than
cooperatives and other types of banks. Contrary to widespread belief, cooperatives do not offer
more flexibility than other banks.
Finally, the questionnaire asked how the characteristics of both borrower and project
affect the bank’s willingness to renegotiate rather than take the case to court.  In general, banks
in the sample reply that they are willing to renegotiate as long as they are confident that the client
is willing to repay. Accordingly previous experience with the borrower and reputation in the
community are key variables in the decision (Table 18). Repayment capacity and information
about the effort and care put into the project are also considered important.13
Collateral and Default
The survey breaks loans down into six categories:
•  Unsecured loans;
•  Loans secured by real estate;
•  Loans backed by other real assets, such as cars or other durable goods;
•  Loans backed by fiduciary collateral, allowing the borrower’s income to be seized
in case of default;
•  Loans secured by stocks or other securities; and
•  Loans in which a third party guarantees repayment.
As Table 19 shows, loans backed by real estate and fiduciary collateral are the most
common type of credit. Only two private banks grant unsecured credit, and then only to well-
known entrepreneurs with whom the bank or their owners have had a long relationship. The
fraction of loans backed by real estate is significantly higher for firms, as is the number of loans
backed by other real assets (except for other banks). The proportion of loans backed by real
estate is also higher for public banks than for other types of intermediaries for loans to firms and
households. Cooperatives and other banks account for the largest proportion of household loans
backed by fiduciary collateral.
A more direct measure of each institution’s lending policy is the ratio between the total
amount of the loan and the value of the collateral. If liquidity and the value of collateral have any
effect on loan contracts, intermediaries should be adjusting the terms and amounts of loans to the
characteristics of the collateral. In Table 20, the figures show, except for fiduciary guarantees,
the ratio of the principal to the estimated value of the asset backing the loan. For fiduciary
guarantees, the figures show the fraction of the borrower’s monthly income that is necessary to
make the loan payments. The salient feature is the considerable variation among types of
guarantees and intermediaries. Loans backed by fiduciary guarantees are far less collateralized
than all the others. Other banks seem to be the most liberal, since they lend the largest amounts
against almost all types of collateral. Private banks appear to be the most conservative, except
when it comes to fiduciary guarantees. Moreover while public and other banks do not
differentiate their policies across firms or individuals, private banks are more liberal in granting
credit to firms than to households, except when a guarantor is available.14
What is the default rate with each type of credit? One problem with answering this
question is the lack of a standard definition of default. When asked intermediaries gave several
definitions of non-performing loans. These definitions fall into three categories: payments that
are more than 1 day late, payments that are more than 10 days late, and payments that are more
than 15 days late. The boundary between performing and non-performing loans varies with the
type of bank. In general, cooperatives and other banks are the most lenient, private banks are the
most rigorous, and public banks are somewhere in the middle. What is surprising is how sharp
these differences are. Six of eight private banks use the first criterion, while all the cooperatives
and two of the three other banks use the third criterion. All but one of the public banks define
default according to the second criterion. But despite these differences there is a pattern to the
default rates for the various intermediaries and kinds of collateral.
First, even though private banks use the first and strictest criterion, their default rates are
lower than those of public banks, except for loans to individuals backed by real assets other than
real estate (Table 21). Private banks also have lower default rates than cooperatives, but the two
types of intermediaries are not really comparable because they use different criteria. Similarly,
the two other banks have the highest default rates in loans backed by real estate, other assets, and
fiduciary collateral, although they use the third and weakest criterion.
Second, bankers report that default rates differ according to the type of collateral. These
differences are independent of the characteristics of the institution and borrower and of the
criteria used to measure the default rate. The default rate on loans backed by securities and other
assets or guarantors is usually negligible, and the default rate on loans backed by real estate tends
to be lower than the rate for loans guaranteed by other real assets or fiduciary collateral. This
evidence supports the hypothesis that the type of collateral has a significant effect on the
allocation and performance of loans—a phenomenon consistent with the variations in loan-to-
collateral ratio as a function of the collateral type.  Given this fact it is appropriate to ask whether
collateral affects the mode of resolution for defaulted loans.  Does it affect the amount recovered
by the lender?
Most defaulted loans never reach the courts (Table 22). Civil trials carry serious costs
that represent a net loss for both borrower and lender. For this reason both parties are willing to
bargain rather than turn to the courts. As Table 22 shows, private banks resolve a larger number
of defaulting loans through renegotiation than public banks. In addition both public and private15
banks are more likely to settle loans to firms through direct bargaining than loans to households.
Finally defaulted loans that are guaranteed with stocks or guarantors are enforced in court less
frequently than loans backed by other types of collateral.
Table 16 reports only loans extended to firms and thus excludes cooperatives. As the
table shows, recovery rates are uniformly much lower with court procedures than with direct
renegotiation. The proportion of loans recovered through renegotiation is remarkably high.
Civil Law and Its Enforcement
Courts are commonly considered the ultimate enforcement mechanism, since the law explicitly
defines contractual forms and procedures for resolving conflicts among agents. But procedures
are only one part of the story.  The key issue is how effectively is the law enforced. Costa Rica
has two different types of procedures for collecting debts, one for individual debts and the other
for the total liabilities of an individual or a firm. The procedures are similar to those used in other
civil law countries (see Monge, Cascante and Hall 2000).
Procedures for Collecting Individual Debts
Depending on how well defined the debt is, the creditor needs to start either an ordinary or
executive trial. Ordinary trials require the creditor to establish the existence and amount of the
debt, while executive trials simply enforce the debt. The type of executive procedure used
depends on the form of collateral and can be simple (no specified collateral), mortgage (real
estate) or pledge (other assets). A different procedure applies when one of the parties belongs to
the public sector (Table 17).
Simple trials set in motion procedures that allow the creditor to seize enough assets from
the debtor to repay the debt plus 50 percent of the interest and costs of the proceeding. The
procedure is faster with specified collateral, requiring little in the way of valuation procedures
and research to determine ownership of the asset(s).
15 With collateral other than real estate, it is
automatically presumed that the debtor accedes to executive privilege, that is, that the document
defines the existence and amount of the debt. With real estate the contract must explicitly specify
whether the debtor accedes to executive privileges. If not, the only legal procedure required is a
simple trial.
                                                       
15 Specifying collateral requires listing the loan in the Public Registry.16
Procedures Governing Total Debt of Individuals and Firms
A number of procedures govern total debts of firms and individuals: bankruptcies (firms),
insolvencies (individuals), and administration with reorganization by judicial intervention (a
procedure very similar to Chapter 11 in United States), and special proceedings for liquidating
financial intermediaries and securities market traders (Table 18). All procedures begin by
freezing payments on any debt to give the bankruptcy receiver time to examine the documents
backing all claims. Debtors as well as creditors can initiate these proceedings, usually for one of
the following reasons:
•  A debtor defaults on one or several debts (proof is required);
•  A business closes or a debtor disappears unexpectedly; or
•  A debtor transfers all or a large share of assets to third parties.
The process defines two types of creditors: common and separate. Separate creditors are
those with specified collateral (mortgages and pledges), those with claims arising from renting
farms or real estate to the debtor, and the public sector. Debts to the government have priority
over all others.
16
In 1989 a new procedure was introduced for firms in financial distress: administration
with reorganization and judicial intervention (Table 18).
17 A debtor could initiate the procedure
on very minor grounds. The debtor was required to show up-to-date accounts for the last year
and to present a financial statement and details of liabilities; the debtor must not have declared
bankruptcy, had bankruptcy procedures initiated against the firm, or been convicted of criminal
damage to private or public property. When the court declared the procedure open, it named a
receiver in charge of managing the firm and its assets. This legal protection could last up to three
years. The debtor was required to turn over management of the firm to a receiver (by law a
lawyer) and to stop distributing dividends.
The new procedure had profound effects on creditors. First, it eliminated all executive
and ordinary trials against a debtor, as well as any other procedure that involved the debtor (even
                                                       
16 Even with specified collateral, separate creditors are adversely affected by a bankruptcy. First, the value of the
collateral must be set by a specialist named by the court. Second, unless a date is set for the legal auction, the
bankruptcy proceeding must include a court hearing—often a source of considerable delays. Creditors may also
benefit: if the auction does not generate enough money to cover the debts, separate creditors can become a common
creditor. This option can be valuable if ex post the creditor learns that the value of the collateral is lower than
expected.17
as a guarantor). Second, it impeded the initiation of new collection procedures against the debtor.
Finally, interest on affected debts ceased to accrue.  In a country like Costa Rica, where inflation
has caused nominal interest rates to rise to more than 30 percent, stopping the accrual of interest
can in itself significantly erode the real value of a debt. As expected, before the 1996 reform the
law prompted many firms, even large ones, to request such legal protection.
Legal Enforcement
Three measures are important in appraising how well courts function: their accuracy in
determining and enforcing commitments, their accessibility to the contracting parties, and their
effectiveness in resolving conflicts promptly. The first is largely abstract, since no ideal
benchmark exists for verdicts and no analysis has been undertaken. For this reason this analysis
is confined to the two other measures.
Monetary costs of procedures. The cost of legal trials is an important dimension of the
laws that protect the rights of creditors. Either party must take the costs of initiating a legal
procedure into consideration when deciding to pursue a lawsuit. These net costs arise because of
legal fees, procedural costs, and most importantly, because of lawyers’ honoraria, which are
aimed at increasing the potential net payoff at the expense of the other side. Thus, regardless of
the verdict, both parties could be better off resolving a conflict on their own, replicating the
transfers a judge would dictate and saving all the resources that would be sunk into the legal
process. The more resources the procedures require, the more likely it is that parties will find
alternative methods of resolving disputes. More importantly, rational forward-looking agents will
avoid the possibility of conflict or change the conditions they will confront if a conflict arises.
They can even avoid contracting in the first place.
From the perspective of a creditor deciding whether to start a trial, lawyers’ honoraria are
the single most important monetary cost to consider. Other judicial costs that are not covered by
general tax revenue (such as required certifications) are very minor. Lawyers’ effective fees
therefore give a good indication of the cost to the creditor of accessing the civil courts.
In Costa Rica the Colegio de Abogados y Notarios, the lawyers’ association, is very
powerful. Any practicing lawyer or notary (also a lawyer) must be a member of the Colegio.
Lawyers’ honoraria for each type of procedures are fixed by the  Tabla de  Horarios. This
                                                                                                                                                                                  
17 The law was amended in 1996.18
document is a government decree and is jealously watched over by the College.
18 Interviews with
several lawyers specializing in civil law and with banking officials revealed that all lawyers
charge the rates stipulated in the Tabla. Indeed, the only alternative is not to charge at all.
19 Table
19 shows the marginal rates stipulated for the relevant collection procedures, as determined by
the 1996 decree. The amounts have been converted using the October 1998 exchange rate of 250
colones to the U.S. dollar.
The Tabla defines marginal rates. For example, the lawyer for a plaintiff claiming a debt
of US$5,000 backed by a document with executory force would be paid according to the formula
0.125·4000+0.09·1000, or $590 dollars for the entire process. This example shows that the
Tabla is regressive, as honoraria increase less than proportionately with the amount of debt.
Arguably, the scheme should be even more regressive, as the lawyer has to perform practically
the same amount of work regardless of the amount involved in the trial.  The reason for the
positive link between the honoraria and the amounts in dispute is to provide lawyers with an
incentive to serve clients well.
These rates apply to the lawyers for each party. In the case of a debt worth less than
$4,000, then, conflicting parties would spend 50 percent just in lawyers’ fees. In bankruptcies,
judicial intervention, and concourse of creditors, the lawyer acting as receiver and overseeing the
liquidation of assets receives the honoraria. Creditors wanting a lawyer’s assistance to collect
debts in any of these procedures must pay according to the rates displayed above for ordinary or
executive trials.
The rates differ in two important ways. First, an ordinary trial costs twice as much as an
executive trial, encouraging creditors to back their loans with documents that have executive
force. Second, the same rate applies to executive trials regardless of the type or amount of
collateral, even though the duration of a trial, the stages it goes through, and the outcome all
depend on the collateral. If the collateral is substantial, for instance, the trial is settled in the first
stage. Thus even if the cost of complete executive trials is in principle independent of the
collateral, collateral determines the effective cost because it determines the length of the trial. In
fact, the collateral may determine whether the case goes to court at all, depending on how the
                                                       
18 However, in 1998, after the first draft of this paper was written, professional fees were liberalized.
19 The competition among lawyers seems to be based on the quantity and characteristics of cases, and some
anecdotal evidence (but no formal evidence) suggests that there is an excess supply of lawyers.19
creditor perceives the debtor’s intention to repay. For this reason lawyers are not paid the full
honorarium up front; instead, they are paid at each stage of the trial.
As a measure of the effectiveness of legal enforcement, this analysis uses the time
involved in executive procedures, which involve enforcing repayments without having to
establish the existence and amount of a debt. Different variables—type and amount of collateral,
amount of the loan, and type of plaintiff—clearly affect the duration of trials (Table 20). In
addition, disputes are resolved differently (a critical distinction). Some trials are abandoned, for
instance, when the plaintiff agrees to settle.
The analysis is based on two samples from courts in San Jose, the Juzgado Sexto Civil
(Sixth Civil Court) of trials ending in the period 1995-97 (945), and the Alcaldía Tercera Civil
(Third Civil Court of Small Claims) of trials ending in the period 1996-97 (734). The courts were
chosen on the basis of their willingness to provide information. The following information was
recorded for each trial:
•  The duration of each trial in calendar days;
•  The type of guarantee (simple, pledge, and mortgage);
•  The amount of debt, deflated using the consumer price index (CPI) for that
month;
•  The type of plaintiff (financial and non financial); and
•  The reason for terminating the case.
Clerks recorded some of this information themselves, but each file was examined
thoroughly in order to verify information. The summary statistics in Table 20 reveal a pattern of
right skewness: for most cases the duration falls in the left-tail of the distribution. In some cases,
the trials are extremely long. For example, in the Juzgado one case that went to trial lasted 4,941
days and another 4,842 days.
20
Duration of Trials by Type of Collateral.  The summary statistics show that trials
involving debts backed by specified assets are much shorter than trials involving loans not
backed by specific assets (simple trials). This effect can arise from different procedural rules, but
it can also reflect differences in the optimal strategies of the creditor and debtor. The difference
is present in both cases brought to trial and settled out of court. It is also present in simple cases
                                                       
20 Approximately 13.54 and 13.27 years, respectively.20
and pledges in the Alcaldía. Differences also exist in the cases of pledges and of mortgages, but
these variations are not as strong and unambiguous. At the contracting date, or even prior to the
decision to access courts, rational creditors and debtors are likely to foresee these effects, helping
to explain why loans guaranteed by specified collateral perform much better than other loans.
Duration of Trials by Type of Plaintiff. The actions of the parties affect the duration of
trials. A creditor’s experience can influence both the outcome and duration of the proceedings.
Experienced agents are likely to be more successful in collecting debts, both in and outside the
courts, for several reasons. Their experience teaches them how best to pursue repayment for each
type of debt and when to take a case to court. Similarly (and independent of their ability to
collect loans), financial intermediaries are likely to have better judgment about granting a loan
than other types of lenders. Trials in which a financial intermediary is the plaintiff should
therefore be shorter than other trials. The information in Table 20 supports this prediction. In all
four cases the mean and the median for nonintermediaries are much higher than they are for
intermediaries.
Separating the Effect of Collateral and Plaintiff. Is it possible to disentangle the effects of
the different variables on the time required to resolve a case? As plaintiffs, for instance, banks
may have negative effects on the duration of cases simply because banks require specific types
of collateral. But as long as no perfect deterministic relationship (multicollinearity) exists
between the characteristics of the plaintiff and those of the collateral, simple regression
techniques are enough to consistently estimate the effect of each of the variable.
There is a more interesting econometric problem, however.  The same variables that
determine whether a trial is resolved by sentencing or settled out of court may also explain the
time required to reach either type of resolution. Estimating the effect of each variable on the
duration of trials using separate regressions for sentenced and settled cases would provide results
that are biased because of sample selection.  The two pools of cases are not random, and the
estimated effects of the characteristics of plaintiff and collateral on duration would be biased
because these effects are capturing in part the probability of observing the case in either pool.
The authors designed an econometric model (a double Tobit) for this analysis that resolves this
econometric problem by explicitly taking sample selection into account. The model estimates the
effect of observables on the probability of a trial proceeding to sentencing or being settled and on
the duration of the proceedings for both types of plaintiff (Monge, Cascante and Hall 2000).21
The findings are summarized here. First, the coefficient of the amount disputed is
insignificant in the probit regression that separates the cases terminated in settlement from those
terminated in court. Second, collateral in the form of a pledge is the only variable whose
coefficient is not insignificant in the probit. In simple cases pledges increase the probability of a
settlement. The effect of different types of collateral are, however, significant in regressions for
duration, in which the point estimates are much higher than for sentences. The type of plaintiff is
significant in both but is negative only in the equation for settlements. The positive effect on
sentencing could reflect the existence of very old debts in public banks, which seem to have been
common before the 1980 reforms.
Recent Changes
The second part of the 1990s saw some important changes in the Civil Law. Table 21 offers a
synopsis of the major changes.
Prior to the reforms the process of notification created an avenue of escape for debtors.
The law required that defendants be notified in person (or by validated communication at their
domicile) before a trial was initiated. Debtors could avoid being notified by changing their
address or simply hiding. The new law on notifications introduced a variety of modifications
intended to make notification easier. First, parties to a contract can specify their domicile in case
of default. If any of the parties wishes to initiate a trial, the notification must be directed to the
specified address. If the address is invalid, the court can legitimately notify the defendant by
publishing an edict in the Judicial Bulletin and in a newspaper with national circulation.
The most important reform (in October 1998) altered the law governing administration
with reorganization and judicial intervention. The reform was initiated in response to a sharp
increase in the number of cases during the first half of the decade. The new law tightened the
eligibility requirements for this procedure and reduced the benefits to debtors. Under the new
law the judge must be convinced that the debtor’s business is able to survive the financial
hardship of reorganization and intervention. The law allows the judge to directly initiate
bankruptcy if the business is not viable. In addition, the procedure can be used only if a firm’s
bankruptcy entails substantial social costs. While the judge has considerable discretion, the law
suggests the number of employees and business partners necessary to qualify for the procedure.
Further, a procedure can include all the individuals and firms belonging to what is termed the22
“same economic interest group,”whether inside or outside the country. Finally, the debtor is
required to present a plan for the restructuring and repayment of all debts.
For debtors the law now excludes certain types of debts (such as those already in legal
liquidation, those with guarantees not directly linked to a  firm, and payroll debts). Most
importantly, the new law mandates the accrual of interest on defaulted debts. The rate, however,
is set at a level that is likely to be below the rate specified in the contract.
21
Other changes have been introduced to expedite notification prior to the auctioning of an
asset and to increase the effectiveness of the auctions. In addition the provision that allowed any
party to a civil dispute to require the other party to deposit the full amount of legal costs
(including lawyers’ honoraria) during the proceedings has been eliminated. Under this provision
the courts typically denied the right to appeal a verdict if such a deposit was on record prior to
sentencing, significantly increasing the cost of the proceedings.
Finally, in September 1998 the lawyers’ fees set in the Tabla were abolished. In a recent
interpretation of the antitrust law, the Office of the State Attorney  (Procuraduría) made the
practice of fee setting by professional associations illegal. Thus these associations can no longer
mandate the fees their members charge. This change will have important effects in the services
and labor markets, but the most important overall effect is a likely to be a decrease in the cost of
accessing civil courts. Lawyers and their clients can freely negotiate fees for their services,
payments, and any other contingency (for instance, they can stipulate different honoraria for
different verdicts). Time is needed for these changes to have measurable effects. Some
professional associations are even discussing a legal challenge, but the reform is likely to
survive.
An Additional Device: Communication among Intermediaries
In addition to the courts, other social institutions such as  peer pressure, family and social
collateral, and informal networks can help sustain  intertemporal trade in the economy.
Theoretical, empirical, and policy research emphasize the importance of these institutions
(Besley and  Coate, 1991;  Coate and  Ravallion, 1993;  Rashid and  Townsend,1994;  Stiglitz,
                                                       
21 Specifically, for debts in colones, the rate is the Tasa Básica Pasiva, a bank-borrowing rate reported by the
Central Bank, and the Prime Rate for debts in U.S. dollars. However the creditor does not lose the difference
between these and contracted rates, as they accrue to the principal but do not compound.23
1990]). Anecdotal evidence also suggests that they are important in many transactions in Costa
Rica; in fact, unsecured credit is the best-performing category of credit.
22
In large economies, a mechanism such as a credit union that records and makes publicly
available borrowers’ earlier transactions can enhance contracting possibilities, as borrowers are
more predisposed to repay if their future access to credit depends on their references.
23 Credit
bureaus can be private or public; they can be managed directly by a coalition of creditors, or they
can operate as independent firms.
All these variations are present in Costa Rica. A sampling of banks shows that these
institutions are widely used (Table 22). About 60 percent of all the banks use at least one type of
bureau, and private and public bureaus are used almost equally. The response of intermediaries
in the metropolitan area differs dramatically from the response in the countryside, however.
Almost all of the intermediaries in the metropolitan area make use of some type of bureau, while
10 out of 17 banks in rural areas do not use any, as they are more likely to have first-hand
information on the borrowers.
Two bureaus are operated by coalitions of intermediaries, and several are independent
private firms. The coalitions are the Information Center of the Costa Rican Association of Banks
(Central de Información de la Asociación Bancaria Costarricense, or CI-ABC), a private entity,
and the Debtors’ Information Center (Central de Deudores de la SUGEF, or CD-SUGEF), a
publicly administrated entity. Among the second group are companies such as Protectora de
Crédito, Credicomer, Teletec/Telesoft, Sincom Inversiones Rolani, Protecsa, and others.
Interviews were conducted with the managers of CI-ABC, CD-SUGEF, and two of the
independent bureaus. The managers of the private bureaus were reluctant to answer some of the
questions, as they have faced threats and even legal action in the course of doing business.
Competition in the credit information area is also fierce. Both bureaus requested anonymity, so
they have become Bureau A and Bureau B in Table 23.
All the bureaus said that they require their members to commit to providing their own
information.
24,25  CI-ABC and CD-SUGEF serve only banks, while independent bureaus service
                                                       
22 In one particularly picturesque practice, owners and managers of bars and cantinas in some rural areas display the
nicknames and the arrears of clients who leave without paying.
23 For a discussion of these issues, see Melumad and Reichelstein (1986).
24 For instance, Bureau B expelled one of the public commercial banks because it was not providing information
25 After this paper was written, however, the authors learned that one of the bureaus had sold information to a public
bank without requiring reciprocity.24
creditors such as department stores and car dealers. All four bureaus differ in several important
ways. For example CI-ABC and CD-SUGEF report only credit histories; bureaus A and B also
provide information on assets and civil trials. CD-SUGEF’s services are free; CI-ABC charges a
fixed fee per month. The cost of consultations with Bureau B is much lower than with Bureau A
(Bureau A argues that it provides higher-quality information than Bureau B). Bureau B’s
services, which are standardized, are surprisingly cheap: an individual credit report costs only
100  colones (US$0.4). It includes personal data and information on bounced checks and
involvement in civil trials as well as a credit record. It also reports which of the bureau’s clients
have requested data for this individual previously. For the same cost, Bureau B will examine
property and assets and provide information on mortgages and obligations. A complete study that
includes all of the above as well as a record of previous transactions and involvement in firms
costs 400 colones (US$1.6). Finally a corporate business record costs 600 colones (US$2.4) and
includes the name and personal data of the legal representatives and the executive board;
information on capital, outstanding credits, and civil trials, and credit references.
Table 23 shows that the bureaus differ in size, number of years in operation, services
provided, and information technology used. For example, Bureau A has been in business 41
years, and Bureau B for only one year. While Bureau A takes full responsibility for the accuracy
of its reports, the other bureaus do not, as their data are updated directly by the clients. Bureaus
A and B estimate the number of debtors for whom they have data at around 700,000 and
600,000, respectively. However Bureau B had 1,219 businesses and organizations as members at
the time of the interview in 1998. Since the entire population of Costa Rica is around 3.5 million,
existing bureaus have information on the majority of debtors and serve a significant and growing
share of creditors.
Besides formal credit bureaus, creditors use other mechanisms to gather and share
information. The CI-ABC itself evolved from an informal communication network among a
group of bankers that operated under a “gentlemen’s agreement.” The intermediaries in the North
Region (San Carlos) have a similar agreement, and advertise it by displaying posters and giving
away stickers with the logo of all the intermediaries, encouraging the prompt repayment of
loans.
26 Such communication is absent in other communities. In the Valley of El General and the
                                                       
26 Both posters and stickers have the logo of Banco de Costa Rica, Banco C.Q., BanCrecen, Banco del Comercio,
Banco  Federado,  Banco  Nacional,  Banco Popular,  Coocique  R.L., and Mutual  Alajuela. Freely translated into
English, the sticker reads “I pay my bills on time: To be punctual in the payment of your bills is to open for yourself25
region of Los Santos, intermediaries have no communication and seem to be rivals. Even the
branches of the same national commercial bank behave differently, depending on the region.
Finally, many agents, informally known as hawks (gavilanes), specialize in obtaining
information from the Public Registry and other judicial institutions. They work independently for
one or several large creditors, including financial intermediaries and commercial retailers, or for
lawyers who specialize in collection trials. They gather information on assets, pending trials, and
other transactions effected by debtors.
Some Final Thoughts
This paper has examined the institutional features and practices of creditors that help determine
repayment incentives in Costa Rica. The diversity of intermediaries’ behavior and the dispersion
in the default rates make clear that the efficiency of the laws protecting creditors’ rights cannot
be understood without reference to the strategies creditors adopt in their relationships with
borrowers. Although serious weaknesses exist in the effectiveness of courts, the relatively low
average default rate indicates that banks are taking corrective actions to protect themselves, both
by requiring collateral and by relying on their knowledge of specific borrowers (relationship
lending). The evidence seems to support the view that the ineffectiveness and high cost of
judicial protection are reflected not in default rates but in the efficiency of the credit market, the
volume of lending, and the types of loan contracts. Further, other institutional constraints are
relevant to the behavior of different types of banks.  For instance, private banks have lower
default rates than other financial institutions, possibly because their incentives are dictated by
profit maximization rather than by political considerations.
The analysis here has emphasized the design of credit contracts and the relationship
between banks and borrowers. Intermediaries are actively coping with the incentive problems of
borrowers, but some of the findings are puzzling in the light of theoretical models. A salient
conclusion is that repeated interaction and borrowers’ reputation play a crucial role. But while
ex-ante screening and interim control are important considerations, the evidence also shows that
ex-post repayment incentives also play a critical role, as emphasized by recent literature on
incomplete contracts and contracting under limited commitment (Besley and Coate, 1991; Coate
                                                                                                                                                                                  
the doors of the northern zone’s financial system.” (The original Spanish reads “Yo mantengo mis cuentas al día:
Ser puntual en el pago de sus cuentas es abrirse las puertas en el sistema financiero de la zona norte.”)26
and  Ravallion, 1993; Hart and Moore, 1988, 1989;  Monge 1998). The value and type of
guarantees influence the decisions of banks and the outcomes of the relationship at all its stages,
including the decision to grant credit, the performance of loans, the resolution in case of default,
and the amount recovered from nonperforming loans.
The analysis has also looked at judicial enforcement system. The evidence strongly
supports the notion that collateral has a significant effect on the effectiveness of courts in
protecting creditors. This conclusion further underlines the importance of collateral to lending
relationships. Finally, the paper has argued that a rather sophisticated information network
among creditors (used mainly by intermediaries in the metropolitan area) helps to protect
creditors from default. These networks seem less important for intermediaries in rural areas,
possibly because rural institutions have a more accurate informal knowledge of borrowers’
characteristics. Overall, however, information-sharing systems play—and will continue to play—
an important role in preventing defaults and enforcing willingness to pay.27
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a judicial process.34
Box 1.  Intermediaries in the Sample
Intermediary Rural/Metropolitan Phone Calls Visits Questionnaire
Private Banks:
Banco CQ R 30 3 Complete
Banco de San José M 33 3 Complete
Banco del Comercio M 40 4 Complete
Banco ELCA M 35 4 Complete
Banco Improsa M 24 2 Complete
BANEX M 36 4 Complete
BFA M 35 3 Complete
Interfin M 70 3 Complete
Bancrecen M 21 2 Unanswered
Public Banks:
Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago M 16 3 Complete
Banco de  Costa Rica: Complete
San José M 50 3 Complete
Guápiles R 30 1 Complete
Liberia R 32 1 Complete
Limón R 12 1 Complete
Puntarenas R 38 1 Complete
San Carlos R 27 1 Complete
Turrialba R 15 1 Complete
Banco Nacional de Costa Rica: Complete
San José M 30 6 Complete
Guápiles R 10 1 Complete
Limón R 20 1 Complete
Puntarenas R 10 1 Complete
San Carlos R 28 1 Complete
Turrialba R 38 1 Complete
Cooperatives:
COOCIQUE R 25 3 Complete
COOPEALIANZA R 15 3 Complete
COOPESANRAMON R 10 2 Complete
COOPESPARTA R 17 1 Complete
COOTILARAN R 10 1 Complete
COOPESANMARCOS R 15 1 Unanswered
Special Banks:
Banco Federado M 25 2 Complete
Bancoop M 20 3 Complete
BPDC M 29 3 Complete
Total 33 845 6935
Table 1.  Screening Mechanisms Used Frequently or Always (percent)
Demog. Type Inst. Type Item Total
Sample
(31)
Metro
(13)
Rural
(18)
Public
(15)
Private
(8)
Coop
(5)
Other
(3)
Visit the firm 64.5 84.6 50.0 60.0 75.0 60.0 66.6
Study the project evaluation 87.0 92.3 83.3 93.3 87.5 60.0 100.0
Study financial statements 93.5 100.0 88.8 93.3 100.0 66.6 100.0
Analyze project risk 87.0 76.9 94.4 93.3 75.0 66.6 100.0
Analyze sectoral risk 61.2 61.5 61.1 60.0 62.5 60.0 66.6
Analyze international risk 19.3 30.7 11.1 13.3 37.5 20.0 0.0
Assess liquidity of collateral 93.5 92.3 94.4 93.3 100.0 66.6 100.0
Assess market value of collateral 96.7 100.0 94.4 100.0 100.0 66.6 100.0
Check reputation of applicant 90.3 100.0 83.3 93.3 100.0 60.0 100.0
Physically audit collateral 80.6 92.3 72.2 66.6 100.0 100.0 66.6
Suggest modifications to project 54.8 61.5 50.0 60.0 50.0 60.0 33.3
Table 2. Criteria for Granting Loans Considered Important to Crucial (percent of sample)
. Type of Institution Item Total
Sample
(31)
Metro.
(13)
Rural
(18)
Public
(15)
Private
(8)
Coop
(5)
Other
(3)
Solvency of applicant 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Existence of project evaluation 90.3 84.6 94.4 100.0 75.0 66.6 100.0
Profitability of project 96.7 92.3 100.0 100.0 87.5 100.0 100.0
Credit references 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Existence of collateral 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Type of collateral 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Value of collateral 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Liquidity of collateral 96.7 92.3 100.0 100.0 87.5 100.0 100.0
Previous experience with borrower 96.7 100.0 94.4 100.0 87.5 100.0 100.0
Information from visit 96.7 92.3 100.0 100.0 87.5 100.0 100.0
Risk of project 93.5 84.6 100.0 93.3 87.5 100.0 100.0
Economic sector of project 87.0 84.6 88.8 100.0 87.5 60.0 66.6
Table 3. Criteria for Setting Interest Rates Considered Important to Crucial (percent of sample)
 Type of Institution Item Total
Sample
(31)
Metro
(13)
Rural
(18)
Public
(15)
Private
(8)
Coop
(5)
Other
(3)
Loan term 45.1 46.1 44.4 40.0 75.0 20.0 33.3
Type of economic activity 83.8 84.6 83.3 93.3 75.0 60.0 100.0
Amount requested 38.7 46.1 33.3 33.3 87.5 0.0 0.0
Collateral 45.1 53.8 38.8 40.0 87.55 0.0 33.3
Credit references 29.0 38.4 22.2 26.6 62.5 0.0 0.0
Previous experience 35.4 46.1 27.7 26.6 62.5 20.0 33.336
 Table 4. Banks Using Covenants Frequently to Always (percent of sample)
Type of institution Item Total
Sample
(31)
Metro
(13)
Rural
(18)
Public
(15)
Private
(8)
Coop
(5)
Other
(3)
Reports of the project results 83.8 92.3 77.7 93.3 87.5 40.0 100.0
Evolution of the investment plan 93.5 92.3 94.4 100.0 87.5 80.0 100.0
Visit of bank executives to the firm 87.0 92.3 83.3 86.6 87.5 80.0 100.0
Suspension clauses 93.5 92.3 94.4 100.0 87.5 80.0 100.0
 Table 5. Banks Using Covenants to Cover Contingencies (percent of sample)
Type of Institution Item Total
Sample
(31)
Metro
(13)
Rural
(18)
Public
(15)
Private
(8)
Coop
(5)
Other
(3)
Regional shocks affecting project 22.5 7.6 33.3 40.0 0.0 20.0 0.0
Sectoral shocks to project 38.7 38.4 38.8 46.6 12.5 40.0 66.6
Idiosyncratic shocks to project 54.8 76.9 38.8 60.0 62.5 20.0 66.6
Other shocks to borrower 54.8 69.2 44.4 66.6 50.0 20.0 66.6
 Table 6. Banks That Monitor Ongoing Loans Frequently to Always (percent of sample)
Type of institution Item Total
Sample
(31)
Metro
(13)
Rural
(18)
Public
(15)
Private
(8)
Coop
(5)
Other
(3)
Visit of bank representatives 58.0 76.9 44.4 66.6 62.5 20.0 66.6
Phone calls 58.0 76.9 44.4 60.0 87.5 0.0 66.6
Service or technical support 22.5 30.7 16.6 20.0 37.5 20.0 0.0
Bank-firm meetings to evaluate course project 32.2 53.8 16.6 33.3 50.0 0.0 33.3
Monitor investment plan project 90.3 92.3 88.8 100.0 87.5 60.0 100.0
Check and audit financial statements 74.1 92.3 61.1 73.3 87.5 40.0 66.6
Check general solvency of the firm 77.4 84.6 72.2 86.6 87.5 40.0 66.6
Keep informed of other client debts 45.1 53.8 38.8 60.0 50.0 0.0 33.3
Check the behavior of input prices 19.3 23.0 16.6 20.0 37.5 0.0 0.0
 Table 7. Using of Information on Previous Experience (percent of sample)
Type of institution Item Total
Sample
(31)
Metro
(13)
Rural
(18)
Public
(15)
Private
(8)
Coop
(5)
Other
(3)
Keep record of previous clients 96.7 92.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 66.6
Inform clients of this record 58.0 46.1 66.6 66.6 37.5 80.0 33.3
Maintain a client grading system 97.5 100.0 94.4 93.6 100.0 100.0 100.037
 Table 8. Effects of Previous Experience on Loan Contracts (percent of sample)
Type of institution Item Total
Sample
(31)
Metro
(13)
Rural
(18)
Public
(15)
Private
(8)
Coop
(5)
Other
(3)
Time for processing applications 806. 84.6 77.7 86.6 87.5 60.0 66.6
Type of collateral required 83.8 84.6 83.3 80.0 87.5 100.0 66.6
Value or liquidity of collateral 80.6 76.9 83.3 73.3 75.0 100.0 100.0
Evaluation required of credit 77.4 69.2 83.3 93.3 75.0 60.0 33.3
Maturity of loan 58.0 46.1 66.6 73.3 50.0 40.0 33.3
Interest rate charged 54.8 46.1 44.4 84.0 87.5 40.0 66.6
Repayment schedule 61.2 53.8 66.6 60.0 62.5 60.0 66.6
Grace period 51.6 53.8 50.0 53.3 62.5 40.0 33.3
Amount lent 77.4 61.5 88.8 73.3 87.5 100.0 33.3
Other renegotiation clauses 77.4 61.5 88.8 80.0 75.0 80.0 66.6
 Table 9. Shocks That Frequently to Always Justify Renegotiation (percent of sample)
Type of institution Item Total
sample
(31)
Metro
(13)
Rural
(18)
Public
(15)
Private
(8)
Coop
(5)
Other
(3)
Regional problems 35.4 38.4 33.3 40.0 37.5 40.0 0.0
Sectoral problems 45.1 69.2 27.7 33.3 75.0 40.0 33.3
Problems linked directly to the project 54.8 2 44.4 53.3 62.5 40.0 66.6
Borrower problems not directly linked to the project 45.1 46.1 44.4 33.3 50.0 80.0 33.3
Table 10. Banks That Reset Contracts Because of Shocks (frequently or always, percent of sample)
Type of institution Item Total
sample
(31)
Metro
(13)
Rural
(18)
Public
(15)
Private
(8)
Coop
(5)
Other
(3)
Extend period of loans 64.5 84.6 50.0 53.3 100.0 60.0 33.3
Grant grace periods 51.6 61.5 44.4 66.6 62.5 20.0 0.0
Realign interest or principal 51.6 69.2 38.8 40.0 62.5 60.0 66.6
Offer additional loans 12.9 0.0 22.2 20.0 0.0 20.0 0.0
Rearrange terms of liquidation 38.7 53.8 27.7 20.0 100.0 20.0 0.0
 Table 11. What Banks Consider Important or Crucial in Renegotiations or Legal Collection (percent of sample)
Type of institution Item Total
sample
(31)
Metro
(13)
Rural
(18)
Public
(15)
Private
(8)
Coop
(5)
Other
(3)
Experience with client 87.0 92.3 83.3 80.0 100.0 100.0 66.6
Experience with client activity 74.2 84.6 66.6 86.6 100.0 0.0 66.6
Value of collateral 96.7 100.0 94.4 93.3 100.0 100.0 100.0
Net assets of borrower 83.8 92.3 77.7 80.0 100.0 80.0 66.6
Other client debts 77.4 84.6 72.2 86.6 87.5 40.0 66.6
Primary information about  administration of
the project
74.1 92.3 61.1 73.3 100.0 40.0 66.6
Entrepreneurial problems not related to the
project
93.5 92.3 94.4 93.3 100.0 100.0 66.6
Client’s reputation in the community 93.5 92.3 94.4 93.3 100.0 100.0 66.6
Political or sectoral pressures 32.2 53.8 16.6 6.6 62.5 40.0 66.638
 Table 12. Estimated Composition of the Credit Portfolio (percent)
Client Collateral All Public Private Coop Other
(31) (15) (8) (5) (3)
Unsecured credit 1.4 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Real estate 41.4 49.2 34.9 35.9 28.7
Individuals Other real assets 10.0 8.9 12.7 3.9 18.4
Fiduciary 37.9 36.4 27.2 52.4 49.8
Securities and others 5.5 1.7 5.4 3.1 3.0
Guarantor and other 3.9 4.0 5.2 4.4 0
Intermediaries (26) (15) (8) (0) (3)
Unsecured credit 0.8 . . . 2.6 . . . . . .
Real state 55.4 62.7 44.1 . . . 49.6
Firms Other real assets 16.1 18.1 13.9 . . . 13.3
Fiduciary 17.2 12.0 23.0 . . . 26.7
Securities and others 4.2 3.5 4.9 . . . 7.3
Guarantor and other 5.6 4.5 9.3 . . . 3.0
. . .  not applicable.
Note: By law cooperatives may not lend to firms.
Table 13. Average Ratio of Loans to Guarantees
Client Collateral All Public Private Co-op Other
(31) (15) (8) (5) (3)
Unsecured credit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Real estate 78.5 81.0 72.1 80.0 81.7
Individuals Other real assets 69.9 71.8 66.5 66.3 77.3
Fiduciary 34.9 30.7 39.9 38.8 39.2
Securities and others 90.4 90.6 86.9 92.5 100.0
Guarantor and other 93.8 100.0 93.3 90.0 100.0
(26) (15) (8) (0) (3)
Unsecured credit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Real estate 78.3 81.0 73.3 . . . 81.7
Firms Other real assets 71.1 71.8 67.0 . . . 77.3
Fiduciary 34.0 30.7 39.9 . . . 39.2
Securities and others 90.5 90.6 88.6 -. . . 100.0
Guarantor and other 93.6 100.0 88.3 . . . 100.0
. . . not applicable
Note: By law cooperatives may not rent to firms.39
Table 14. Nonperforming Loans (percent of total loans)
Client Criterion Collateral
All
(31)
Public
(15)
Private
(8)
Co-op
(5)
Other
(3)
# of Intermediaries 7 1 6 0 0
Unsecured credit 5.0 --- 5.0 --- ---
>1 day Real estate 9.1 12.5 8.4 --- ---
Other real assets 14.7 14.5 14.8 --- ---
Fiduciary 11.8 17.0 10.8 --- ---
Securities and others 5.4 --- 5.4 --- ---
Guarantor and other 5.4 --- 5.4 --- ---
# of  Intermediaries 14 13 0 0 1
Unsecured credit --- --- --- --- ---
Real estate 14.5 15.3 --- --- 5.0
Individuals More than 10
days
Other real assets 11.8 11.2 --- --- 20.0
Fiduciary 27.3 28.7 --- --- 10.0
Securities and others --- --- --- --- ---
Guarantor and other --- --- --- --- ---
More than 15
days
# of  Intermediaries 10 1 2 5 2
Unsecured credit --- --- --- --- ---
Real estate 16.5 6.0 3.0 15.3 31.5
Other real assets 14.9 5.0 6.5 9 34.0
Fiduciary 22.2 30.0 16.0 19.2 29.0
Securities and others 4.6 --- --- 11.5 ---
Guarantor and other 0.3 --- --- 0.4 ---
# of  Intermediaries 6 1 6 --- ---
More than 1 day Unsecured credit --- --- --- --- ---
Real estate 8.1 12.0 7.3 --- ---
Other real assets 8.9 --- 8.9 --- ---
Fiduciary 8.5 --- 8.5 --- ---
Securities and others 1.3 --- 1.3 --- ---
Guarantor and other --- --- --- --- ---
More than 10
days
# of  Intermediaries 14 13 0 0 1
Unsecured credit --- --- --- --- ---
Real estate 12.8 13.0 --- --- 8.8
Firms Other Real assets 11.5 12.0 --- --- 8.9
Fiduciary 14.9 15.9 --- --- 17.1
Securities and others --- --- --- --- ---
Guarantor and other --- --- --- ---
More than 15
days
# of Intermediaries 5 1 2 0 2
Unsecured credit --- --- --- --- ---
Real estate 14.2 --- 4.0 --- 31.5
Other real assets 18.8 --- 7.0 --- 34.0
Fiduciary 21.3 15.0 12.0 --- 29.0
Securities and others 0.8 --- 1.5 --- ---
Guarantor and other 1.0 --- 15. --- ---
---. not available40
Table 15. Nonperforming Loans Resolved by Renegotiation and Court Procedures (percent of total loans)
Sample
(31)
Public
(15)
Private
(8)
Co-op.
(5)
Other
(3)
Client Collateral
(Intermediaries)
Lega
l
Reneg. Legal Reneg. Lega
l
Reneg. Lega
l
Reneg. Lega
l
Reneg.
Unsecured credit 5.0 95.0 --- --- 5.00 95.0 --- --- --- ---
Real estate 13.0 87.0 15.6 84.4 7.9 91.4 13.9 86.1 13.7 86.3
Indiv. Other real assets 13.1 86.9 14.4 85.6 11.5 87.9 0.4 99.6 18.7 81.3
Fiduciary 20.1 79.7 24.7 75.3 16.0 83.3 20.1 80.0 13.0 87.0
Securities and others 1.1 98.9 0.6 99.4 2.3 97.7 --- 100.0 --- 100.0
Guarantor and other 3.3 96.7 3.00 97.0 4.8 95.2 --- 100.0 --- ---
Unsecured credit 3.0 97.0 --- --- 3.00 97.0 --- --- --- ---
Real estate 10.0 90.0 10.7 89.3 6.9 92.5 --- --- 13.7 86.3
Firms Other real assets 11.3 88.7 12.3 87.7 6.1 93.1 --- --- 18.7 81.3
Fiduciary 13.0 86.8 13.0 87.0 12.9 86.4 --- --- 13.0 87.0
Securities and others 1.6 98.4 0.83 99.2 2.8 97.2 --- --- --- 100.0
Guarantor and other 5.0 95.0 3.00 97.0 6.02 93.3 --- --- --- ---
 Table 16. Nonperforming Loans Recovered through Renegotiation and Legal Collection
All
(26)
Public
(15)
Private
(8)
Other
(3)
Collateral
Legal Reneg. Legal Reneg. Legal Reneg. Legal Reneg.
Unsecured credit 30.0 67.1 --- --- 30.0 100.0 --- ---
Real estate 100 94.8 84.5 99.3 91.9 100.0 89.2 100.0
Other real assets 87.3 75.0 72.9 97.9 80.7 97.1 80.00 50.00
Fiduciary 99.6 100.0 72.3 95.8 50.0 95.0 76.7 90.0
Securities and others 76.0 80.0 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 --- 100.0
Guarantor and other 91.7 100.0 80.0 100.0 --- -- 100.0 ---
---. not available
  Table 17.  Procedures for Judicial Collection of Single Debts
Type of Trial Purpose
Ordinary The court needs to establish the existence and amount of the debt.
Executive  Trials
Simple
Pledge
Mortgage
The court only enforces the debt; executive documents determine the
amount of the debt.
The debt is not backed by a specific good or asset
The debt is directly linked to a specific asset.
Collateral is in the form of real estate.
Monitory trials One or more of the requirements for an executive trial is not fulfilled, or
the debt is based on a document without executive force.41
Table 18.  Procedures for Collecting Multiple Debts
Procedures Purpose Effect on Creditor
Bankruptcy Applies to a firm that cannot repay its
debts and seeks liquidation.
Initially freezes payments. Divides
creditors into common and separate. Pools
all assets for  liquidation.
Insolvency Identical to bankruptcy but applies to
individuals.
Identical to bankruptcy.
Administration and reorganization with
judicial intervention
Helps firms in financial distress survive. Stops the repayment of debts and interest
buildup. Stops ongoing collection trials
and initiation of new ones.
Assembly of creditors Applies to debtors in financial distress.
Coordinates creditors to attain a settlement
with the debtor.
Depends entirely on bargaining between
debtor and creditors.
Collective execution Occurs when multiple trials are taking
place and one or more creditors believe the
debtor’s assets are insufficient.
Like bankruptcy but takes place only when
debts are backed by executive documents.
Liquidation of financial intermediaries Used in place of the administration and
reorganization with judicial intervention.
Depends on intervener, who decides
whether interest accrues during the
procedure.
Table 19.  Marginal Rates for Lawyers’ Honoraria
Amount of debt  (in US$) Type
0-4,000 4,000-8,000 8,000-0,000 20,000 +
Ordinary (%) 25 18 14 10
Executive (%) 12.5 9 7 5
Bankruptcy (% of assets)
Judicial Intervention  (% of assets)
Concourse of Creditors (% of assets)
5 5 5 542
 Table 20.  Duration of Trials in San José
(Juzgado Sexto Civil: Executive trials , 1995-97)
Trials settled out of court Sentenced trials
Statistic All All Simple Pledge Mortgage
Inter-
mediary Other All Simple Pledge Mortgage
Mean   222.8 213.7 272.6 181.5 146.1   172.1   250.0  301.9  342.5 215.0
St. Dev. 106.0 347.2 452.7 262.7 155.2 354.2 337.3 660.8 798.1 202.5
Median 397.7 102.0 119.5 98.0 88.5 77.0 134.0 141.5 105.0 155.0
Maximum 4,941.
0
4,842.0 4,842.0 181.5 146.1 4,842.0 2,460.0 4,941.0 4,941.0 864.0
Cases 945.0 835.0 342.0 373.0 120.0 389.0 446.0 110.0 73.0 29.0
Alcaldía  Tercera Civil:  Executive trials 1996-97
Trials settled out of court Sentenced trials
Statistic All All Simple Pledge Mortgage
Inter-
mediary Other All Simple Pledge
Mean  340.1  295.1  308.0  149.8   45.8  287.7  306.5  588.7  593.0 98.0
St. Dev.  391.4  362.4  369.2  228.0   44.4  352.3  378.1  449.6 449.2  
Median  200.5  158.0  174.5  68.0  32.5  172.0  147.0  489.0  494.0  98.0
Maxim. 2396.0 2396.0 2396.0 1202.0  107.0 2396.0 2297.0 2072.0 2072.0  98.0
# Cases  750.0  635.0  586.0   45.0   4.0  384.0   251.0   115.0   114.043
 Table 21. Recent Changes in the Administration of Civil Law
Item Main reform
Notifications If prearranged contractually, initial notification can be made using
newspapers announcements.
Deposit of costs Parties can no longer require other parties to deposit the total legal costs
at the inception of the trial.
Auction of collateral The procedure is faster, and restrictions designed to reduce the use of
fake bidders have been increased.
Lawyers’ honoraria Honoraria are no longer necessarily set according to the tabla but can be
set by bargaining with clients.
Judicial intervention The debtors’ prerequisites for qualifying for this procedure are more
stringent, and the benefits of using this procedure have been reduced (for
instance interest accrues to creditors during the intervention).
Table 22.  Banks Using Credit Bureaus
Use Public Bureaus
Use Private Bureaus Yes No Total
Yes 8(4) 3(3) 11(7)
No 10(5) 10(1) 20(6)
Total 18(9) 13(4) 31(13)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are for banks operating in the San Jose metropolitan area.44
Table 23. Four Credit Bureaus in Costa Rica
Managed by coalitions Independent firms
Item SUGEF ABC Bureau A Bureau B
Years in operation 2 1 41 5
Number of clients 103 intermediaries 8 banks Not revealed 1219
Individuals in database 424,342 Unknown 700,000
a . 600,000
a .
Employees 4 2 60 15
Processing of  debtors’
information
Banks Banks Employees Clients/Employees
Clients committed to
providing own
information
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of information Positive and
negative
Negative Positive and
negative
Negative
Grading of debtors Yes No Yes No
Other information No Not yet Yes Yes
Consultations per day 200
a Not revealed Not revealed 7,500
Transfer of information Messengers Modem Phone-Modem Modem-Fax
Waiting time for
information
24 hours Instant Instant; 24 hours
for updates
Instant
Memory Infinite 10 years Infinite 3,000 days
Other services No No Yes Yes
Charges Free Monthly fee Per consult Per  consult
International services No No Yes Yes
a. Figures are approximate.